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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
2 
a. Nature of Case. 
3 
This case is about whether strict compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b )(3) 
4 
5 is required prior to default judgment being entered against a party after his or her attorney 
6 withdraws. 
7 b. Course of Proceedings Below. 
B 
The district court allowed the attorney for defendants Murat Kiroglu, Mega Group 
9 
10 
International, LLC, Izopoli Group, LLC, and Florida Floors and Decor, Inc. (collectively referred 
1 1 to herein as "Izopoli") to withdraw from representation pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
12 Procedure 1 l(b)(2). R., Vol. I, p. 92-93. After Izopoli failed to appear after the withdrawal 
13 (either individually, or through an attorney), Plaintiff Saundra McDavid sought and obtained a 
14 
15 
default judgment against Izopoli. R., Vol. I, p. 96-106. After receiving the default judgment, 
1 6 Izopoli sought and obtained the services of new counsel. R., Vol. I, p. 112, ~ 4. Izopoli filed a 
1 7 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment (the "Motion"), based on the failure to 
18 
properly serve the Order of Withdrawal. R., Vol. I, p. 108-121. A hearing was held on the 
19 
Motion on August 24, 2011. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18-29. On September 9, 2011, the District Judge 
20 
21 entered an order denying the Motion. R., Vol. I, p. 134-35. A Notice of Appeal was filed on 
22 October 6, 2011. R., Vol. I, p. 136-42. 
23 
c. Statement of Facts. 
24 
A Complaint in this matter was filed on or around January 25, 2010. R., Vol. I, p. 6-22. 
25 
26 After litigation ensued (see R. Vol. I, p. 22-84) on December 13, 2010, Izopoli's previous 
27 
28 
2s Appellants' Brief 
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counsel, Brian Knox, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel. R., Vol. I, p. 85-91. This 
withdrawal was granted by the court, and an Order granting leave to withdraw was entered on or 
about February 17, 2011. R., Vol. I, p. 92-93. This Order was served on Defendants via regular 
U.S. Mail on or around March 1, 2011. R., Vol. I, p. 94-95; p. JOO, fj 3. 
At the time of the withdrawal, Murat Kiroglu was in Turkey (i.e., outside the United 
States). R., Vol. I, p. 112, ~ 3. Kiroglu is the principal member, owner, and officer of the other 
Appellants. Id., if 2. Accordingly, Izopoli did not receive notice of the withdrawal until 
Kiroglu's return to the United States in mid-March, 2011. Id., ,- 3. At that time, Izopoli sought 
substitute counsel in Idaho and secured the services of an attorney. Id., if 4. However, in late 
April, that attorney indicated to Izopoli that he would not be able to proceed due to an unforeseen 
and undisclosed conflict. Id. Izopoli eventually obtained legal counsel, who immediately moved 
to set aside the default judgments based on the deficiencies in service of the Order of Withdrawal 
and the fact that Kiroglu was out of the country at the time of the withdrawal. Id., if 5; see also 
R. Vol. I, p. 108-121. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
2. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err by denying Appellants' Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment without addressing whether the default and default judgment 
were void and should be set aside as a matter of law? 
Did the trial court err by exercising discretion in denying Appellants' Motion to 
Set Aside Default and Default Judgment as void under LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) when 
there was not strict compliance with LR.C.P. 1 l(b)(3)? 
Did the trial court err in denying Appellants' Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment based on excusable neglect when there was not strict 
compliance with LR.C.P. 1 l(b)(3)? 
29 Appellants' Brief 
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a. 
Whether the appellant is entitled to attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to Idaho 
Code §12-121. 
3. ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Erred in Denying the Motion Without Addressing Whether 
the Default and Default Judgment Were Void as a Matter of Law. 
In the Motion, Izopoli sought two separate grounds for setting aside the Default and 
Default Judgment both that the default and judgment were void as a matter of law, and that the 
court should find that excusable neglect occurred. R., Vol. I, p. 118-19. 1 These arguments were 
pursued in the alternative, meaning either argument would provide grounds for the trial court to 
set aside the entry of default and allow the case to proceed on its merits. However, in its oral 
comments at the hearing on the matter, the court only addressed the exercise of its discretion in 
not finding excusable neglect. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 25, L. 14 - p. 29, L. 16. The trial court failed to 
address the merits of the argument that the default and default judgment were void as a matter of 
law for lack of compliance with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(3). As the arguments were 
pursued in the alternative, the trial court erred by ignoring the Appellants' strongest argument in 
favor of setting aside the dismissal. 
b. To the Extent She Did Decide the Issue, the Trial Court Erred by Exercising 
Discretion in Denying the Appellants' Argument That the Default and 
Default Judgment Were Void Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). 
LR.C.P. 60(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
1 Each of these arguments is explored in further detail below. 
29 Appellants' Brief 
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lR.C.P. 60(b). 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . ( 4) the judgment is void; ... 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
Rule 60(b)(4) makes it clear that a default and default judgment should be set aside when 
the judgment is void. See JR. C.P. 60(b)(4). "[R]elief from a void judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b)( 4) is nondiscretionary and is subject to free review on appeal." Fisher Systems Leasing, 
Inc. v. J & J Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design, Inc., 135 Idaho 624, 627, 21 P.3d 946, 949 (Id. 
Ct. App., 2001). Accordingly, if a judgment is void, the trial court has no discretion to set aside 
the judgment it simply must be set aside. 
In the context of a default judgment entered after the withdrawal of counsel, I.R.C.P. 
11 (b)(3) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
If an attorney is granted leave to withdraw, the court shall enter an 
order permitting the attorney to withdraw and directing the 
attorney's client to appoint another attorney to appear, or to appear 
in person by filing a written notice with the court stating how the 
client will proceed without an attorney, within 20 days from the 
date of service or mailing of the order to the client. After the order 
is entered, the withdrawing attorney shall forthwith, with due 
diligence, serve copies of the same upon the client and all other 
parties of the action and shall file proof of service with the court. 
The withdrawing attorney may make such service upon the client 
by personal service or by certified mail to the last known address 
most likely to give notice to the client, which service shall be 
complete upon mailing ... 
JR.C.P. 11 (b)(3) (emphasis added). 
2s Appellants' Brief 
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"It is well settled that strict compliance, not substantial compliance, is required when 
Rule l l(b)(3) is applicable. Judgments obtained without strict compliance to this rule are void." 
Fisher Systems Leasing, Inc. v. J & J Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design, Inc., 135 Idaho at 628 
(citing Reinwald v. Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 803 P .2d 1017 (Id. Ct. App., 1991) and Wright v. 
Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 950 P.2d 1257 (Id., 1998)). The Idaho Court of Appeals cogently 
explained the reasoning for strict compliance with Rule l l(b)(3): 
This rule carries an extraordinary impact. It authorizes a court to 
enter a default judgment against a party who has responded to a 
suit by engaging an attorney, making an appearance, and - in this 
case - filing an answer coupled with a counterclaim. Such a party 
has not defaulted in any ordinary sense of the term. He has not 
failed to appear and defend. To the contrary, he has appeared and 
defended through counsel but simply has failed to take additional 
action upon his attorney's withdrawal. 
Rodell v. Nelson, 113 Idaho 945, 947-48, 750 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Id. Ct. App., 1988). 
Here, the withdrawing attorney failed to comply with the requirements of Rule l l(b)(3). 
The Order of Withdrawal was served on Izopoli via regular U.S. Mail, which was not received 
until substantially all of the 20-day period had expired. R., Vol. I, p. 94-95; p. 100, f 3; p. 112, 
f 3. McDavid does not dispute that the withdrawing attorney did not comply with Rule 11 (b )(3 ), 
but instead argues that Izopoli had sufficient notice of the withdrawal and should have appeared. 
R., Vol. I, p. 100, ,- 3; p. 129-132. However, this argument ignored the strict compliance 
requirement outlined by both the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals for 
withdrawals of counsel. Strict compliance is required in order for the withdrawal to be effective 
and the 20-day time period to be triggered. Moreover, as explained by the Court of Appeals: 
2s Appellants' Brief 
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Rule 11 (b )(3) provides a readily identifiable, straightforward 
requirement for counsel and the courts to satisfy. Compliance with 
the rule obviates any need for judges to weigh conflicting evidence 
of actual notice or to speculate concerning a litigant's state of 
mind. An entitlement to relief [when there is noncompliance with 
the rule] produces consistent, predictable results, unaffected by the 
varying philosophies that underlie exercises of discretion by 
individual judges. 
Knight Ins. Co. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 60, 704 P .2d 960, 964 (Id. Ct. App., 1985). 
Because the withdrawing counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 (b )(3 ), Izopoli is 
entitled to the relief requested - to have the default and default judgment set aside. The trial 
court does not have discretion to deny Izopoli's request. The trial court erred in exercising its 
discretion (to the extent it decided the issue at all) by denying the Motion on this basis. 
c. The Trial Court Erred in Denying the Motion Based on Excusable Neglect 
When There Was Not Strict Compliance With I.R.C.P. ll(b)(3) and There 
Was Excusable Neglect by Izopoli. 
The trial court exercised her discretion in denying the Motion based on Izopoli's 
argument that excusable neglect had occurred. Kiroglu was out of the country at the time of the 
withdrawal, and did not get notice of the withdrawal until mid- to late-March 2012, after the 
Order had been entered. He then diligently sought to obtain new counsel and proceed with the 
case. Nevertheless, the court entered a default judgment against Izopoli. Within three months of 
the default judgment being entered, Izopoli sought to set it aside, based (in part) on excusable 
neglect. 
"Whether a party's conduct, in allowing a default to be entered, constitutes "excusable 
neglect" is determined by examining what might be expected of a reasonably prudent person 
29 Appellants' Brief 
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under similar circumstances. The courts must weigh each case in light of its unique facts." 
2 Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada Cty., 104 Idaho 727, 732, 662 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Id. Ct. App., 
3 
1983). 
4 
5 The delay in locating new counsel was excusable based on two factors Kiroglu's 
6 absence from the country and the previous counsel's failure to strictly comply with Rule 
7 l l(b)(3). Pursuant to Rule 1 l(b)(3), the time period for Izopoli to appear in the matter does not 
8 
begin until the Order of Withdrawal is properly served under the Rule. Since proper service 
9 
10 
never occurred, the 20-day time period never began and Izopoli's failure to appear within that 
1 1 time period is excusable. 
12 Additionally, Izopoli's delay in locating new counsel and appearing in the matter is 
13 
excused by Kiroglu' s absence from the country, and the original substitute counsel's failure to 
14 
15 
inform Izopoli of his conflicts. The trial court ruled that this three month delay was simply too 
16 substantial, without discussing or otherwise finding that the specific reasons for the delay were 
17 inexcusable. Tr., Vol. I, p. 28, L. 24 p. 29, L. 6. Absent a specific finding by the trial court as 
18 
to the specific reasons for the delay, the trial court erred in exercising her discretion that the 
19 
delay was inexcusable. 
20 
21 "Judgments by default are not favored, and the general rule in doubtful cases is to grant 
22 relief from the default in order to reach a judgment on the merits ... [P]rocedural rules, other 
23 than those which are jurisdictional, should be applied to promote the disposition of causes upon 
24 
their merits." Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada Cty, 104 Idaho at 732. By denying the 
25 
26 
Motion based on excusable neglect, the trial court allowed a default judgment to take the place of 
27 
28 
29 Appellants' Brief 
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a judgment on the merits. The trial court erred in exercising its discretion, and its decision 
2 
should be reversed. 
3 
d. Izopoli is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
4 
5 The previous cases on strict compliance with Rule 11 (b)(3) for service of the Order of 
6 Withdrawal are unambiguous. Further, the reasons for strict compliance are similarly clear -
7 they eliminate the need for the trial court to examine whether a party had "actual notice" of the 
8 
withdrawal or whether "substantial compliance" with the requirements of the rule occurred. As 
9 
10 
this authority is clear and well-developed, McDavid's defense of the Motion (and this subsequent 
1 1 appeal) is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. For this reason, Izopoli is entitled to 
1 2 an award of attorney fees and costs for pursuing this appeal. 
13 
4. CONCLUSION 
14 
For the above reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision, set aside the 
15 
1 6 entry of default and default judgment, remand this case to the trial court to set the case for trial 
17 on the merits, and award Appellants' their attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
18 
19 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2012. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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